Les Theoremata d'esse et essentia (ca 1278-1285), qui, en depit d'une edition critique deja ancienne (Hocedez, 1930), n'avaient pas encore ete traduits integralement en francais a ce jour, apparaissent comme l'uvre majeure pour bien saisir la genese doctrinale et conceptuelle de la theorie de la distinction reelle. Peu de temps avant les Questions disputees sur l'etre et l'essence (1286-1287), qui sont au cur du debat entre Gilles de Rome (ca 1245-1316), partisan d'une distinction reelle entre l'etre et l'essence, (...) et Henri de Gand (ca 1217-1293), promoteur d'une theorie de la distinction " intentionnelle ", les Theoremes apparaissent comme un essai de synthese, dans lequel le maitre augustin donne un expose d'ensemble des arguments qui le conduisent a faire de l'etre une res (" chose " au sens de " realite ") a part entiere. Dans ces conditions, les disciples de Thomas d'Aquin (ca 1224-1274) n'ont pas manque de voir, en Gilles, l'un des partisans d'une these qu'ils revendiquaient comme un heritage de l'Aquinate. Les Theoremes revelent cependant une pensee incontestablement personnelle, et manifestent le caractere resolument original de Gilles de Rome, metaphysicien incontournable du XIIIe siecle finissant. (shrink)

In the De cognitione angelorum and then in the Ordinatio, Gilles of Rome dedicates long chapters to angelic language. His starting point is a question from Thomas Aquinas about the “secrets of hearts” : they can only be known through corporeal signs, which unwillingly manifest them. Gilles uses Thomas’s postulate that the acts of will are not visible to others, to reject his definition of speaking as a thought voluntarily conveyed to others, and generalizes from his answer: (...) thoughts need to be made manifest through a sign. He develops a theory describing the different types of signs according to their addressees, and analyses them according to several criteria. In particular, from a careful analysis of the signs used by men, Gilles wonders whether the different types of signs used both by men and angels are natural or voluntary, from the point of view of both their composition and their meaning, basing his questioning on the reflections on language and signs in his earlier philosophical commentaries. This insistence on the need for signs will lead Gilles to give different answers to the classic questions about the difference between thought and language, the possibility of addressing a particular angel, and lying. (shrink)

In the De cognitione angelorum and then in the Ordinatio, Gilles of Rome dedicates long chapters to angelic language. His starting point is a question from Thomas Aquinas about the “secrets of hearts” : they can only be known through corporeal signs, which unwillingly manifest them. Gilles uses Thomas’s postulate that the acts of will are not visible to others, to reject his definition of speaking as a thought voluntarily conveyed to others, and generalizes from his answer: (...) thoughts need to be made manifest through a sign. He develops a theory describing the different types of signs according to their addressees, and analyses them according to several criteria. In particular, from a careful analysis of the signs used by men, Gilles wonders whether the different types of signs used both by men and angels are natural or voluntary, from the point of view of both their composition and their meaning, basing his questioning on the reflections on language and signs in his earlier philosophical commentaries. This insistence on the need for signs will lead Gilles to give different answers to the classic questions about the difference between thought and language, the possibility of addressing a particular angel, and lying. (shrink)

"Ce volume presente la seconde partie d'une etude sur l'angelologie medievale dont la premiere partie a paru dans cette meme collection sous le titre: 'Les anges et la philosophie: subjectivite et fonction cosmologique des substances separees au XIIIe siecle', Etudes de philosophie medievale LXXXII, Paris, 2002"--T.p. verso.

Does the second writing of the commentary on Petrus Lombardus, Sent. II by Giles of Rome constitute a break compared to the first writing? The accurate comparison of the problem of the temporal beginning of the world and its treatment - where Reportatio and Ordinatio take the shape of a commentary on Phys., VIII, 1 - shows that the presence of Thomas Aquinas is even stronger after 1277. Refusing Aristotle’s and “modern” theologians’ arguments, in Ordinatio in continuity with Reportatio (...) Giles advocates a philosophical position in favor of the temporal beginning of the world - theoretically possible though not given - as opposed to Thomas’ standard position, but not to his argumentation in Thomas de Aquino, In VIII Phys, 2. (shrink)

This paper addresses the conception of theology developed by Giles of Rome from the Reportatio of his lecture on the second book of the Sentences to his fifth Quodlibet. It demonstrates that, from the beginning of his career, Giles discredited the power of philosophical reason in the realm of theology, a discipline which he conceived as a defensive, rhetorical and exegetical practice. Henry of Ghent was the principal adversary attacked by Giles, who challenged the scientific legitimacy of theology which (...) Henry, after Thomas Aquinas, had established as the highest speculative discipline. In the conclusion, the paper highlights strong similarities between Giles’ theological epistemology and Godfrey of Fontaines’ conception and practices of university sciences. (shrink)

Does the second writing of the commentary on Petrus Lombardus, Sent. II by Giles of Rome constitute a break compared to the first writing? The accurate comparison of the problem of the temporal beginning of the world and its treatment - where Reportatio and Ordinatio take the shape of a commentary on Phys., VIII, 1 - shows that the presence of Thomas Aquinas is even stronger after 1277. Refusing Aristotle’s and “modern” theologians’ arguments, in Ordinatio in continuity with Reportatio (...) Giles advocates a philosophical position in favor of the temporal beginning of the world - theoretically possible though not given - as opposed to Thomas’ standard position, but not to his argumentation in Thomas de Aquino, In VIII Phys, 2. (shrink)

The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education (...) from two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles’ views on logic in the De regimine principum, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the studia of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles’ s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn’t use its more powerful instrument, i.e. the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education (...) from two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles’ views on logic in the De regimine principum, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the studia of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles’ s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn’t use its more powerful instrument, i.e. the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

"Ce volume presente la seconde partie d'une etude sur l'angelologie medievale dont la premiere partie a paru dans cette meme collection sous le titre: 'Les anges et la philosophie: subjectivite et fonction cosmologique des substances separees au XIIIe siecle', Etudes de philosophie medievale LXXXII, Paris, 2002"--T.p. verso.

This paper addresses the conception of theology developed by Giles of Rome from the Reportatio of his lecture on the second book of the Sentences to his fifth Quodlibet. It demonstrates that, from the beginning of his career, Giles discredited the power of philosophical reason in the realm of theology, a discipline which he conceived as a defensive, rhetorical and exegetical practice. Henry of Ghent was the principal adversary attacked by Giles, who challenged the scientific legitimacy of theology which (...) Henry, after Thomas Aquinas, had established as the highest speculative discipline. In the conclusion, the paper highlights strong similarities between Giles’ theological epistemology and Godfrey of Fontaines’ conception and practices of university sciences. (shrink)

Le droit de la personne et du corps pourrait être nommé le droit des masques. Persona, à Rome, c'est le masque de théâtre de l’acteur, et le rôle joué par lui, qui devait parler avec éclat (sonare), c’est-à-dire à la fois le signe et l’action représentée. La modernité a révisé cette étymologie, sous la double influence (souvent contraire) du christianisme et du rationalisme, exprimant l’un et l’autre la croyance en une nature singulière de la personne, divine ou rationnelle. D’abord, (...) le droit du corps protège le corps car il porte la trace de la personne, comme l’homme porte la trace de Dieu. Les droits de l’homme font ainsi de la dignité, à l’imitation de la théologie catholique, la catégorie qui permet de protéger le corps : l’euthanasie est interdite, l’avortement est une exception. Ensuite seulement, sous l’influence du rationalisme, le droit fait du corps une liberté du sujet qui peut donc presque tout : admissibilité d’une reproduction assistée, dons d’organes… Cette toute-puissance de l’individu exprime la croyance en l’Homme-Dieu. Un retour à l’origine étymologique romaine où le masque n’était qu’un signe, est-il aujourd’hui pensable ? À l’image des Masques Bambara ou des masques Grecs de Dionysos, la personne, et le corps ne seraient alors que des récits créant un monde de signification qui institue le sujet. L’humanité serait alors ce récit : il n’y aurait « personne » derrière le masque. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ROBERT ORFORD'S ATTACK ON GILES OF ROME I N TWO PREVIOUS ARTICLES, I tried to demonstrate how Robert Orford drew upon the thought of Giles of Rome in order to formulate his own explanation of hylomorphism and the so-called real distinction between essence and existence.1 Orford, it will be remembered, was one of the earliest disciples of his colleague St. Thomas Aquinas, and-more important- is the first (...) 'llhomist we know of who turned to Giles in order to gain an understanding of these basic philosophic problems, and who wove Giles's ideas into his own elaboration of what he took to be St. Thomas's position regarding them. In view of this recognition of Giles as an appropriate guide to a Thomist grasp of these issues, it is surprising to find among Orford's works the Reprobationes dfotorUJn a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum.2 The Reprobationes is a strange document. In it, as I shall show later, Orford seeks every opportunity to find fault with Giles. Indeed, his criticisms, hardly ever of any substance, are at times so "picky" they cause the reader to wonder as to his real purpose in writing them down in the first place. In this article, I shall review the historical context of the Reprobationes and try to show what it was about Giles of Rome that so irritated the Dominican Orford. The early catalogues contain no more than two entries for 1 See F. Kelley, "The Egidean influence in Robert Orford's doctrine on Form", Thomist, 47, 1, January, 1983, pp. 77-99, and "Two early English Thomists: Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent", Thomist, 45, 3, July, 1981, pp. 345-387. 2 This work is extant in one manuscript, viz. MS. Merton 276, fol. 20ra50ra. It has been edited by A. Vella: Robert d'Orford Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum, Paris, 1968. 70 ROBERT ORFORD'S ATTACK ON GILES OF ROME 71 Orford.3 However, from references he made in his extant writings, viz., Sciendum, Contra dicta Henrici and Reprobationes, we know the titles at least of some of his other writings. As one might have expected, Orford wrote commentaries on the books of the Sentences. In addition to the references to these commentaries he mentions also a De unitate formae, Super 2 de sommo et vigilia, Super 6 de M etaphysica and De generatione. We know of Orford's part in certain disputed questions and of his sermon in rn93. Finally, we have offered our reasons elsewhere for attributing to him the opuscule entitled De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis.4 From the mere fact that Orford saw the necessity of writing against Giles of Rome in defense of St. Thomas Aquinas, one might have thought that in Giles one had found an antagonist of the Angelic Doctor. For a long time Giles was taken to have been not an adversary but rather a stout defender of his teacher, St. Thomas.5 The picture of Giles of Rome as the loyal Thomist, the legend as it has more recently been labelled, derived in no small measure from the erroneous ascription to him of the work which is in fact Richard Knapwell's, viz. Correctivum corruptorii 'Quare '.6 Once this mistaken ascription had been corrected and further study was done, mainly by E. Hocedez, Giles no longer appeared as having been the staunch and loyal Thomist of the legend. On the contrary, Hocedez says of him: Gilles decidement n'est pas le thomiste, clans le sens profond du mot, qui s'est donne Thomas pour Maitre et guide de sa pensee: a For a full account of what the catalogues have under Orford's name, see A. Vella, "Robert of Orford and his place in the scholastic controversies at Oxford in the late xiiith century" (Oxford Univ. B.Litt. thesis 1946), MS. B.Litt., c. 30, vol. 1, Bodleian Library, pp. 12-27. 4 See F. Kelley," The Egidean influence", pp. 90-96. 5 See F. Lajard, "Gilles de Rome", Histoire litteraire de la France, 30 (1888), pp. 421-566. 6 "Nous croyons que ce qui a le plus contribue a faire... (shrink)

Disputing the Unity of the World: The Importance of Res and the Influence of Averroes in Giles of Rome's Critique of T homas Aquinas concerning the Unity of the World G. j. MCALEER 1. INTRODUCTION tILES OF ROME earned, after a decidedly difficult start, the most complete honors open to an academic religious in the Middle Ages. Joining the Hermits of St. Augustine at age 14, he became the first regent master of his order at the University of (...) Paris ; his works were made compul- sory in the education of students entering the Hermits in 1287; finally, in 1292 he became the general of the order itself.' Giles is significant, as Mandonnet puts it, because he "est incontestablement au premier rang des th~ologiens de la fin du XIII e si~cle. "2 But this is not all. Giles is also important to the period because his writings were censured by the same commission that composed the famous Parisian condemnation of 1277. As a result of this I would like to thank Robert Wielockx, Jos Decorte, Jennifer DeRose, and especially two anonymous referees of theJHP, for their extremely useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. P. Nash, "Giles of Rome," New Catholic Eneydopedia, vol. 6 , 485 9 "P. Mandonnet, O. P., "La carri6re scolaire de Gilles de Rome," Revue des sciences philosophiques et thlologiques 4 09t~ 497. [~9] 3 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 36: I JANUARY 1998 censure, Giles had to leave.. (shrink)

Ce livre part à la recherche des origines de la controverse sur l'unité de l'intellect humain, qui a opposé les penseurs les plus célèbres du XIIIe siècle. Parmi eux, Thomas d'Aquin, Albert le Grand, Siger de Brabant, Gilles de Rome, sans compter bien des maîtres inconnus de la Sorbonne. Qui a imaginé, le premier, l'existence d'un intellect unique pour tous les hommes? Pourquoi les théologiens de l'époque y ont-ils vu une grave hérésie? Comment les maîtres et les étudiants (...) ont-ils continué à en débattre, malgré deux condamnations prononcées par l'évêque de Paris à la demande du pape? Ce livre est le premier à proposer une histoire des textes qui en témoignent, tant à la Sorbonne qu'à Oxford, depuis les débuts de l'Université médiévale jusqu'à l'apaisement de la controverse. On y verra les ruses que les universitaires ont opposées à la censure, en conquérant une liberté de pensée dont le XXIe siècle peut s'inspirer, face aux menaces sur l'autonomie de la Raison. (shrink)

Résumé — Alors que, pour Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome, Dieu peut ajouter à la création une série infinie d’espèces de perfection croissante sans compromettre sa transcendance et sans contrevenir aux lois de la logique, Henri de Gand et Godefroid de Fontaines développent des arguments puissants contre cette même idée, arguant notamment que la production d’une telle série impliquerait une infinité en acte d’idées en Dieu. L’article montre comment, dans son Quodlibet I, q. 2 où il expose (...) et critique systématiquement les arguments de Godefroid et d’Henri, Jacques de Viterbe renoue avec une position proche de celle de Thomas et Gilles.— While Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome believed that God could produce an infinite number of increasingly more perfect creatures without threatening his transcendence or breaching the laws of logic, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines argued against that belief, holding that such an ability on God’s part would entail the existence of an actual infinity of ideas in the divine intellect. One author who was to be influenced by Henry’s arguments was Godfrey of Fontaines whose views James of Viterbo refutes in Quodlibet I, q. 2. The article examines the detail of James’s arguments against Godfrey and in favor of the view, much like Thomas’ and Giles’, that God can add to the total amount of perfection in creation. (shrink)

La solution de Thomas d’Aquin au problème de l’intensification des qualités souffre d’une certaine instabilité et, dans la génération suivante, a été disloquée par les différentes contraintes qu’elle tentait de concilier. Cet article explore les réponses apportées par Gilles de Rome, Godefroid de Fontaines, Pierre d’Auvergne et Thomas de Sutton. Introduite par Godefroid, mais développée par Sutton, la notion de mode va jouer un rôle très important. La solution de Sutton, particulièrement, invite à une comparaison avec la théorie (...) des modes intrinsèques chez Duns Scot. (shrink)

Cet article étudie le rapport entre pouvoir spirituel et pouvoir temporel dans la pensée de l’augustinien Jacques de Viterbe († 1307/8), à la lumière de l’édition de deux sermones de mortuis inédits, écrits et prononcés entre 1303 et 1305, lorsqu’il était archevêque de Naples. Cette étude vise donc à offrir une interprétation de la pensée politique de Jacques, à travers la lecture diachronique de ses œuvres, à partir de la Disputatio prima de quolibet jusqu’à ses derniers écrits, afin de suivre (...) l’évolution de sa théorie politique, de son ouverture progressive à la perspective de Thomas d’Aquin et de la réception du principe aristotélicien de la naturalitas de la société humaine. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.